 |
| Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel delivers remarks as Navy Secretary Ray Mabus looks on during a briefing at the Pentagon, March 18, 2014. Hagel and Mabus addressed plans to implement security changes following the Sept. 16, 2013, shooting rampage at the Washington Navy Yard that left 12 employees dead and several others wounded. DOD photo by Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo |
A Department of Defense Review says there were troubling gaps in the DOD's ability to detect, prevent, and respond to instances where someone working for the department--- a government employee, a member of the military or a contractor –- decides to inflict harm on the department and its people.
This is in reference to a federal contractor who shot 12 fellow workers at the Washington Navy Yard six months ago.
16 September 2013, Aaron Alexis went into the Naval Sea Systems Command building 197 and killed 12 people before being shot by police.
The incident became the second deadliest mass murder at a U.S. military base, following the 2009 shootings at Fort Hood.
Reportedly, Alexis had been an employee for subcontractor doing work on a Navy-Marine Corps computer network.
With a modified (sawed off) Remington 870 Express Tactical 12-gauge shotgun and two boxes of shells, Alexis allegedly entered the Navy Yard in his rented Prius, using a valid pass, then went into building 197 and began shooting people (many in the head at close range), then took a gun from a security officer he had shot and killed, and continued his rampage.
The defense department review is an attempt to address the security standards that might have prevented the shooting with four recommended actions:
*implement a continuous evaluation program of personnel with access to DOD facilities or classified information, including DOD contractors and military and civilian personnel. “While individuals with security clearances undergo periodic reinvestigations,” the secretary said, “I am directing the department to establish automated reviews of cleared personnel that will continuously pull information from law enforcement and other relevant databases.” Hagel said this will help trigger an alert if derogatory information such as an arrest becomes available for someone holding a security clearance.
- establish an Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center that quickly analyzes the results of the automated record checks, helps connect the dots, and determines whether follow-up action is needed. The center also will advise and support Department of Defense components to ensure appropriate action is taken on each case.
- centralize authority and accountability for physical and personal security under a single staff assistant located in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence...these responsibilities are fractured among multiple DOD components...This action will identify one person within DOD who is responsible for leading efforts to counter insider threats.
- accelerate development of the Defense Manpower Data Center’s Identity Management Enterprise Services Architecture, called IMESA, allowing DOD security officers to share access control information and continuously vet individuals against U.S. government databases.
The DOD is also reviewing how to proceed with other actions including:
- reducing the number of personnel holding Secret security clearances by at least 10 percent, a recommendation in line with October 2013 guidance from the director of national intelligence.
- reducing DOD’s reliance on background investigations conducted by the Office of Personnel Management and analyze the cost, efficiency and effectiveness of returning the clearance review process to DOD.
- developing more effective ways to screen recruits, further destigmatize treatment and ensure the quality of mental health care within DOD.
A Department of Defense dispatch, via Amiercan Forces Press Service, says Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has directed Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael Vickers to "...develop an implementation plan based on the recommendations and report back on progress in June..."
"...Everything the Department of Defense is doing [supports] the broader, governmentwide review of the oversight of security and suitability standards of federal employees and contractors...That review was led by the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of Personnel Management..." said Hagel.
The review parallels earlier findings by the Congressional Oversight Committee released in a report in February, titled "“Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process."
According to the Committee Chairman, Congressman Darrell Issa, "...Congress has a responsibility to investigate the process that permitted Aaron Alexis to receive and maintain a security clearance, and Congress must take steps to improve that process to prevent dangerous people from gaining access to secure federal facilities and information. Congress, [the Office of Personnel Management], the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies must work together to tighten this process and ensure that fewer individuals like Aaron Alexis slip through the cracks in the future..."
That investigation found:
- Non-cooperation of 450 police departments with federal background investigators –
- Lack of continuous monitoring [of those obtaining security clearances]
- Regulations prohibit background checkers from looking at the Internet or social media when performing checks –
Issa said today:
"...The Department of Defense reports released this morning concur with the findings of the Committee’s Staff Report released on February 11, 2014...The Department and the Committee both concluded that Aaron Alexis could have been stopped and his clearance could have been pulled before the Navy Yard shooting if all information available was properly obtained and reported. Additionally, the Department recognizes that the federal security clearance process must be fixed and agrees with the Committee’s recommendations: continuous evaluation must be implemented; more data is needed for investigations to be complete, including utilizing social media and other Internet sources; and local law enforcement agencies must comply with existing federal law by providing relevant criminal history information to investigators..."
The Oversight Committee's release quotes Issa saying: "...It is imperative that we fix these glaring problems before another tragedy occurs..."
References/Links:
Special Report: Navy Yard Shooting reviews Recommend Security Changes
Secretary of Defense's Recommendations on Washington Navy Yard Review
DOD Internal Review of the Washington Navy Yard Shooting
Independent Review of the Washington Navy Yard Shooting
Navy Investigation Into the Washington Navy Yard Shooting - Final Report
Navy Investigation Into the Washington Navy Yard Shooting - Final Report
Navy Secretary's Endorsement - Washington Navy Yard - Navy Judge Advocate General Review
Washington Navy Yard - Navy Judge Advocate General List of Actions
Oversight Committee Report
MORE AT:
